Key concepts in the philosophy of mind and consciousness
20 cards · philosophy
Sign up to start studying this deck
| Front | Back |
|---|---|
| Mind–Body Problem | How mind relates to brain and the physical world Central question of how mental phenomena connect with physical processes. |
| Substance Dualism | Mind and body are distinct, separable substances Descartes held that thinking substance is non-extended and distinct from matter. |
| Property Dualism | Mental properties are nonphysical properties of physical stuff One kind of substance, two kinds of properties—physical and mental. |
| Physicalism | Everything is physical; mental states are physical states Also called materialism; denies irreducible mental properties. |
| Type Identity Theory | Mental state types are identical to brain state types E.g., pain is a specific neural kind, not just any token occurrence. |
| Behaviorism | Mental states are behavioral dispositions Analyzes the mind in terms of observable behavior and tendencies. |
| Functionalism | Mental states are defined by their causal roles What matters is input–output role and relations to other states. |
| Multiple Realizability | Same mental state can be realized in different media Supports functionalism; minds could be implemented in silicon or biology. |
| Qualia | Subjective, felt qualities of experience The "what it’s like" aspect, such as the redness in seeing red. |
| Intentionality | Aboutness or directedness of mental states Beliefs and desires are about things; pains may lack aboutness. |
| The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Why physical processes give rise to experience Chalmers contrasts it with explaining cognitive and behavioral functions. |
| Knowledge Argument | Complete physical knowledge may omit facts about experience Suggests that knowing all physics doesn’t capture knowing what it’s like. |
| Mary’s Room | Color scientist learns something new upon seeing red Jackson’s thought experiment illustrating the knowledge argument. |
| Philosophical Zombies | Conceivable duplicates without conscious experience Used to argue that physicalism can’t explain consciousness fully. |
| Chinese Room | Syntax is not sufficient for semantics Searle argues symbol manipulation alone doesn’t yield understanding. |
| Epiphenomenalism | Mental events lack causal influence on the physical Mental states are byproducts; challenges accounts of mental causation. |
| Causal Closure of the Physical | Every physical event has a sufficient physical cause A key premise pressuring dualism and motivating physicalism. |
| Determinism | Every event is necessitated by prior states and laws If true, it raises questions about responsibility and freedom. |
| Compatibilism | Free will is compatible with determinism Freedom as acting from one’s reasons without external coercion. |
| Libertarianism | Free will requires indeterminism and agent causation An incompatibilist view affirming genuine alternative possibilities. |